One of the main points of the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) is that measurements are not special, they are merely an entangling interaction between the system being measured and the measurement apparatus. Because measurements are not special, there is nothing nonunitary. In fact, I can tell you what the measurement unitary is, both in toy models and for real physical experiments.
I should also point out that there isn't any active "branching" in MWI. What I mean is that the branches are already there: It's just a question of basis. To see this, suppose you prepare two qubits in the Bell state $\left| {\rm Bell}\right\rangle = \left( \left| 0 0 \right\rangle + \left| 1 1 \right\rangle \right)/\sqrt{2}$ (in the $Z$ basis) and give one qubit to Alice and the other to Bob.
If Alice measures $Z$ on her qubit, she does so using a measurement apparatus initially in the "default" state $\left|0 \right\rangle$ (this is merely a convention). After measuring her qubit, the MWI state is now $\left| {\rm Bell}\right\rangle \to \left( \left| 0 0 0\right\rangle + \left| 1 1 1 \right\rangle \right)/\sqrt{2}$ where the third qubit reflects the state of the measurement apparatus (0 if no photon detected / "default", 1 if photon detected / "click"). If Bob also measures $Z$, the state becomes $\left| {\rm Bell}\right\rangle \to \left( \left| 0 0 0 0 \right\rangle + \left| 1 1 1 1 \right\rangle \right)/\sqrt{2}$.
As you can see, the state of the physical system (the two qubits originally in the Bell state) is completely unchanged. We've merely entangled the measurement devices to that state in the same basis. This is how measurements work. It's also easy to check that this continues to hold no matter what Alice and Bob measure: As long as we write the pre-measurement state in the basis of the operators we intend to measure, every measurement will look like what I wrote above. This shows that nothing drastic happens upon measurement, nor does anything nonlocal happen.
Importantly, the main premise of MWI is that you never consider open systems, but instead consider the smallest effectively closed system. You then realize that regular old quantum mechanics (QM) without weird features (like nonlocality / wavefunction collapse) explain things that used to seem weird (like measurements), if you recognize that the measurement apparatus is part of the system. So the lesson is that QM works just fine for closed systems.
MWI is the realization that (i) measurements aren't weird, (ii) if you identify a truly closed system, all QM is just unitary time evolution, and (iii) the apparent randomness of measurement outcomes is an artifact of our being internal to a larger closed system.
I don't know why anyone would think or write about MWI for open systems. MWI is not a theory but an interpretation. It's a way of explaining how something we originally thought to be weird and "different" (measurement) is actually just another example of regular QM. Prior to MWI, people wondered if observers, consciousness, or even humans were essential. But quantum describes the universe, which does not need to contain humans (and didn't always).
If anything, the lesson of MWI is that you should either (1) not do quantum mechanics on open systems, but instead identify the smallest system that can be treated as closed and do unitary QM there or (2) forfeit the right to complain if some aspect of QM seems to stop working / seems different. Considering an "open system" is literally just an approximation to considering a larger closed system (where MWI is fine), in which we ignore the details of a large part of the system, which we call the "environment".
The Copenhagen picture with all of its weirdness is still useful for calculations. The machinery of open quantum systems is even more practically useful. But neither of these makes sense if you're trying to address fundamental questions about the universe or quantum mechanics, since the universe is fundamentally closed and QM can always be represented unitarily (if you've accounted for all degrees of freedom). The whole point of MWI is that the weird / bothersome aspects of quantum mechanics are artifacts of considering open systems.
So to me it's not sensible / enlightening to consider MWI with open systems. And that's because there is no place for open systems (nor nonunitary channels) in MWI, because those are just approximations of regular QM for some closed system that we were too lazy to identify. Also, it's not altogether surprising (nor is it interesting) that if you try to use the concepts of MWI on an open system, they may stop making sense. Finally, as I said before, there is no "active" branching in MWI: The branches are always there.