It is an opinion I occasionally hear, and perhaps hold myself, that the resolution to the 'infinities' that crop up in various bits of physics are artefacts of the approximation that space-time is continuous. If at some base granularity things are discrete then there is a natural cut-off. This also appeals from an information perspective as continuity is usually expressed via some reference to the real numbers, most of which contain an infinite amount of information (I'm thinking here of the criticisms raised in Gisin's work without committing to his more radical proposals). Having fundamental discreteness avoids the criticism that some finite region could contain infinite amounts of information.
The same people who say this (including perhaps myself) also seem rather comfortable with the fundamentality of the Lorentz group (I here mean $SL(2;\mathbb{C})$) and more crucially its irreducible unitary representations. Unlike those of $SU(2)$ (i.e spins) which are indexed by natural numbers, the Lorentz irreps are indexed by $(\rho,m)$ where $\rho\in \mathbb{R}$ and $m\in \mathbb{Z}$. It would seem then that these irreps contain can contain 'an infinite amount of information' and so when seen as localised entities (I'm thinking of them as EPRL like spin-foam edges/vertices) they seem equally suspect.
Is there a reason why the appearance of the reals in the irreps of the Lorentz group should be thought of in a different way to the appearance of the real numbers in other areas of physics, particularly from a quantum information perspective?