# Tag Info

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Locality does not have to be abandoned. But: QM shows that some experimental correlations have no causal explanations. What the experimental confirmations of the violation of Bell's inequalities show is that the random part of QM, the Born rule, is to be taken seriously: no deterministic mechanism is hidden beyond [what would be seemingly] random results, ...

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Sorry, the answer is rather lame, and has more to do with PR, impact factors, and science journalism than actual physics. The point is that "locality" comes with many different meanings. The straightforward meaning is that a theory is local if you can't violate relativistic causality, i.e. you can't get information about anything outside your past light ...

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I can only answer with regard to the first experiment that you mentioned 'Experimental nonlocal and surreal Bohmian trajectories' as I do not understand the others sufficiently, but hopefully this will help. In your question you write 'regarding the first experiment I'm not sure whether those trajectories are only relevant to the Bohmian interpretation and ...

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Quantum mechanics does not introduce "new" probability theory. Classical probability theory works well in quantum mechanics for calculating mean values, deviations, etc. For example: $$<x> = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty}x\rho(x)dx,$$ where $\rho(x)=|\psi(x)|^2$. The new thing in quantum mechanics is superposition of states. For example, consider ...

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These diagrams will help you to understand the difference. It is in the placement of Heisenberg cut:

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When two particles interact, do they spontaneously start treating each other as particles in terms of potentials and so forth? I'm not sure what you mean here. There are no particles at this level, just localized quanta that happen to follow certain rules. If you're talking about the interactions of something like QFT, then yes, but this is more a ...

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I have not seen Manousakis's model before this moment, and I write in some haste as this question is likely to be closed soon. But I just want to point out some of the outlandish features that such models possess. Stapp's concept is apparently that the world is objectively in a superposition, and then objectively jumps or "collapses" into a particular ...

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On paper, the difference between a theory and an interpretation is very clear. If two distinct sets of ideas/explanations generate experimentally distinguishable predictions, then they are two different theories. If they use different concepts but produce identical experimentally verifiable predictions, then they are two different interpretations of the same ...

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Not exactly. First, the different branches of the universal wavefunction (under MWI or any other interpretation) are different from the "universes" of a multiverse model. Wheeler's cited comments (from Patton & Wheeler, Quantum Gravity, Ch. 9) hypothesize a situation where the various coupling constants arise in quantum mechanics during cosmogony, and ...

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Bohmian Mechanics (a.k.a. pilot wave theory) may well predict the same results as the Copenhagen interpretation, but it uses different assumptions. In particular, it assumes a preferred reference frame so that it can have an absolute time ordering of events. Thus, Bohmian Mechanics denies the relativity of simultaneity required by special relativity. At ...

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If you accept positivism, it becomes obvious that "consciousness causes collapse" cannot possibly be distinguished experimentally from the Copahangen principle as long as you accept that you are conscious. This "interpretation" makes claims about the knowledge of another (non-conscious) observer, claiming that it does not alter the state of other systems. ...

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Two major reasons: there are not generally accepted, testable definitions for either consciousness or wavefunction collapse. If there were such definitions, it would probably be possible to falsify or verify those theories.

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The answer is (A) (unless there's another branch of the universal wave function in which you perform a different experiment). I'm not sure that you mean by "what prevents (B) from happening?". The Schrodinger equation? The MWI doesn't say that "Anything that could logically happen, does." You still have some initial wave function that the Schrodinger ...

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MWI doesn't postulate branches. MWI just makes the basic assumptions that are used in all of quantum mechanics: Hilbert space unitary evolution The Copenhagen interpretation (CI) adds an additional postulate: nonunitary collapse of the wavefunction in some special processes called measurements The additional postulate in CI is unnecessary, because ...

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