Both @John Hunter and @notovny answered your question. The following is a little more discussion of the good comment by @llmari Karonen on the @notovny response.
We have sufficient information from observing the decay of a very large number of identical radionuclides to claim we know the decay rate, hence the probability of decay, with no uncertainty. This probability is the same using either a classical (objective or frequency) approach, or a Bayesian (subjective) approach.
For the classical approach, the probability of event $E$ is $P_O = lim_{N \to \infty} {N(E) \over N}$ where $N$ is the number of independent trials and $N(E)$ is the number of times event $E$ occurs. For a very large $N$, observing $N(E)$, we know $P_O$ with essentially no uncertainty.
For the Bayesian approach, we assume a prior value for the event, $P_S$, and update it to a more accurate estimate for $P_S$, called the posterior, as we gather more information. For a large body of information we know the updated $P_S$ with no essentially uncertainty.
With sufficient information, the classical objective probability $P_O$ and the Bayesian subjective probability $P_S$ for the event are the same: one value with no uncertainty.
See the text Bayesian Reliability Analysis by Martz and Waller for information on the Bayesian approach.
For the more general case where we have limited information (trials for the classical case or state of knowledge for the Bayesian case) we have uncertainty in the probability. Using classical statistical inference this uncertainty can be expressed as a confidence interval for $P_O$. Using the Bayesian approach we can treat the classical $P_O$ as a random variable and express the uncertainty in $P_O$ as a subjective probability distribution for $P_O$ based on our imperfect state of knowledge. Our uncertainty is reduced as we perform more trials or improve our state of knowledge; the confidence interval is reduced and the subjective probability distribution is "narrowed". (More trials contribute to our improved state of knowledge, but in general other factors also contribute.)
For cases with significant state of knowledge (epistemic) uncertainty, we have insufficient information to use the probability measure of uncertainty, even in a Bayesian sense. For example, using a Bayesian approach, if we have a poor prior, and little information to update to a posterior, the poor prior cannot be modified accurately to provide a good posterior and the Bayesian estimate can be way off. For such situations, we can use a broader measure of uncertainty, such as evidence theory, and estimate belief/plausibility where belief and plausibility are, respectively, lower and upper bounds on probability.