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A preprint just came out claiming that incompatibilty is not requried to demonstrate generalized contextuality. My question isn't about generalized contextuality---which I don't quite understand---but rather about "textbook" contextuality of the Kochen-Specker variety. The involvement of incompatible observables seems to be a ubiquitous ingredient for contextuality, but it has never been clear to me as to why it's needed.

EDIT:

I should de-emphasize my reference to the KS theorem since incompatibility is required for it by definition. My question is instead about the need for incompatibility to observe contextuality in general. I define the latter with Abramsky's definition as measurement statistics which are "locally consistent but globally inconsistent". In that same paper, he states that

the key ingedient of quantum mechanics which enables the possibility of contextual phenomena, while still allowing a consistent description of our actual empirical observations,is the presence of incompatible observables.

Although that seems to be the case in almost all examples of contextuality, I can't find any justification for why incompatibility is a key ingredient. There could very well be a set of globally incompatible observations which can all be performed together. If not, why not?

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  • $\begingroup$ You say you don’t see why incompatibility is needed for contextuality. Have you tried to understand in detail the Kochen-Specker proof? This is where I would start from. $\endgroup$
    – Andrea
    Jun 29, 2021 at 7:20
  • $\begingroup$ Yes I have. If you think I haven't, could you please point me in the right direction? This is where I would start from. $\endgroup$
    – Tfovid
    Jun 29, 2021 at 7:49
  • $\begingroup$ Doesn’t the proof of the theorem make use of incompatibility? $\endgroup$
    – Andrea
    Jun 29, 2021 at 7:52
  • $\begingroup$ Just because it makes use of it, it's not clear why it's needed. That's what I'm getting at. Hence the question: Why is incompatibility required for contextuality? $\endgroup$
    – Tfovid
    Jun 29, 2021 at 7:53
  • $\begingroup$ Maybe why, why, or why questions are not really well posed. On the other hand, proofs are explanations of a very rigorous sort. “It is a fundamental assumption in the proof” often is as much as you will get. You could try taking that assumption out and try where the same proof leads you. You could try to prove contextuality without incompatibility. $\endgroup$
    – Andrea
    Jun 29, 2021 at 11:06

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First, let's talk about what Abramsky means when he says that measurements are "locally consistent". Suppose we have a set of three measurements $M_{1},M_{2},M_{3}$ every which can take only values $\pm 1$, and our contexts are given by $\{ \, \{M_{1},M_{2} \}, ,\ \{M_{2},M_{3}\} \, \}$, that is, only $M_{1}$ and $M_{3}$ are not compatible. If we set the behavior of our system(the context's probabilities) to be the extreme distributions $p_{M_{1},M_{2}}(+1,+1) = 1$ and $p_{M_{2},M_{3}}(-1,-1) = 1$ we get different probabilities for $M_{2}$ when we marginalize $p_{M_{1},M_{2}}$ and $p_{M_{2},M_{3}}$. We say that this is a disturbing scenario and this is what Abramsky would call "locally inconsistent". It happens that many theories, in particular classical probability theory and quantum mechanics, are non-disturbing. That is, if the measurement $M$ is in the context $C_{1}$ as well as in context $C_{2}$, we have $$ Prob(M = m | C_{1}) = Prob(M = m |C_{2}) $$ Where $Prob(M=m|C)$ is just the probability of finding $M=m$ when we marginalize though the context $C$. Or, in general, if $U \subseteq C_{1} \cap C_{2}$, $p_{U}^{C_{1}} = p_{U}^{C_{2}}$ where $p_{U}^{C}$ is the probability distribution for finding a specific set of value for the measurements in $U$ obtained by marginalization in $C$.

If we accept only non-disturbing models and we suppose that every measurement is compatible, we will have only one big maximal context $C$ such that every measurement is in it. Therefore, of course, we can define a global distribution of probabilities that is simply $p_{C}$ and the distribution of every set of measurements is defined $p_{U} = p_{U}^{C}$. We have no contextuality effects!

This is enough to show that in quantum mechanics the answer is yes, we do need incompatibility for contextuality effects to arise. If, on the other hand, we allow for disturbing models, we are left with the question: if I have a set of compatible measurements $C$ and $U \subseteq C$, can I say that $p_{U}^{C} = p_{U}$? The answer is yes.

Proof: Let's assume that our context is finite $C = \{ M_{1},..., M_{N} \}$ and that, without loss of generality, $U = \{ M_{1},...,M_{u}\}$ with $u\leq N$. Since $C$ is a context, it has a refinement $M$ (that is, a measurement) associated with it along with functions $f_{1},f_{2},...,f_{N}$ such that $$ Prob(M_{1} = m_{1}, ... , M_{N} = m_{N}|C) = \sum_{f_{1}(m) = m_{1} \, and \, \cdots \, and f_{N}(m)=m_{N}} Prob(M = m) $$ and, as well, $$ Prob(M_{1} = m_{1}, ... , M_{u} = m_{u}|C) = \sum_{f_{1}(m) = m_{1} \, and \, \cdots \, and f_{u}(m)=m_{u}} Prob(M = m) $$ what we wish to prove is that

$$ Prob(M_{1} = m_{1}, ... , M_{u} = m_{u}|C) = \sum_{m_{u+1},\cdots,m_{N}} Prob(M_{1} = m_{1}, ... , M_{N} = m_{N}|C) $$ Well, \begin{align*} \sum_{m_{u+1},\cdots,m_{N}} Prob(M_{1} = m_{1}, ... , M_{N} = m_{N}|C) &= \sum_{m_{u+1},\cdots,m_{N}} \left( \sum_{f_{1}(m) = m_{1} \, and \, \cdots \, and f_{N}(m)=m_{N}} Prob(M = m) \right) \\ & \text{since we are adding every value of $m_{u+1},\cdots,m_{N}$} \\ &= \sum_{f_{1}(m) = m_{1} \, and \, \cdots \, and f_{u}(m)=m_{u}} Prob(M = m) \\ &= Prob(M_{1} = m_{1}, ... , M_{u} = m_{u}|C) \end{align*}


The example of disturbing scenario and the formalism and notation used to define compatibility are taken from the book

Amaral, B., & Cunha, T. M. (2018). On Graph Approaches to Contextuality and their Role in Quantum Theory (SpringerBriefs in Mathematics) (1st ed. 2018 ed.). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93827-1'

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  • $\begingroup$ The "leap of faith" I'm not following is in the paragraph which you start with "This is enough to show [...]". I kind of see how there wouldn't be any contextuality to speak of if we only had one all-encompassing context. However, how does this preclude the fact that we could get measurement statistics which aren't real? I.e., which cannot generated from a fixed, pre-existing ensemble distribution? $\endgroup$
    – Tfovid
    Aug 13, 2021 at 11:13

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