Quantum Bayesianism and the Copenhagen interpretation Is Quantum Bayesianism (QBism) preferable than the Copenhagen interpretation of QM?
 A: The Copenhagen interpretation has never been precisely defined and exists in many forms. One should mistrust any source which claims to state what it actually is. In particular, the dominant form, called the Dirac-von Neumann, or orthodox, interpretation by Jeffrey Bub, does not feature complementarity (wave-particle duality) and already treats quantum theory as a probability theory.  
So, this is a distinction without a difference. Statisticians these days almost invariably apply a Bayesian interpretation to probabilities. Probabilities in quantum mechanics are no different, except that they apply to the case where results are actually indeterminate, not to the case where they are determined by unknown quantities. This was already shown by von Neumann, and is the basis of the Dirac-von Neumann form of the Copenhagen interpretation. The main difference is that while von Neumann used mathematics, others, like this one, have only hand wavy arguments. 
To count as interpretation, one must explicitly relate the interpretation to the mathematical structure, and demonstrate why the mathematical structure necessitates the Schrodinger equation. I have clarified the Dirac-von Neumann interpretation and shown this in a Bayesian context in a published paper The Hilbert space of conditional clauses

A: Fuchs directly addresses the issue of potential experimental distinctions in this interview:  
Quantum Physics is No More Mysterious Than Crossing the Street: A Conversation with Chris Fuchs
https://www.discovermagazine.com/the-sciences/quantum-physics-is-no-more-mysterious-than-crossing-the-street
