I'm interested in the function played by the free will assumption made by any number of no-go theorems in quantum mechanics. While searching the archives for prior questions, I found this one from 5 years ago.
The most highly rated answer includes a claim, "To assert that the indeterminacy of measurement results is, in some way, equivalent to a notion of "free will" ... is a proposition that is not grounded upon any physical principle", that I find intriguing but dubious. Could we not work our way backwards to infer the physical principle involved?
It seems that the function of the free will assumption in Bell-type no-go theorems is to secure or underwrite the claim that measurement settings are free variables; meaning, in the words of J. S. Bell, that "the values of such variables have implications only in their future light cones".
This seems to presuppose the assumption that may be taken as a principle of physics (applicable, at least, to experiments in which Alice and Bob measure the spin of entangled particles at a space-like separation); namely, that physicists are capable of designing and performing physics experiments in which measurement device settings are free variables.
This assumption seems uncontroversial; but, if made, it naturally invites the question as to what gives physicists this capability; and, it would seem that we could legitimately call the source of that capability the free will of the physicist.
True or false?