My question is based on several theorems which have some features in common. First of them is famous PBR-theorem. It states that quantum state cannot be considered as statistical and does not represent the knowledge of the system's state.
The second theorem demonstrates that superposition cannot be epistemic.
The link: https://arxiv.org/abs/1501.05969
And, finally, the third theorem was derived using the pervious one and states that some macrorealist ontologies are incompatible with quantum mechanics.
The link: https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.00022
I have added links to the last two theorems, because there are some details that are difficult to sum up.
I met some people who used the type of theorems which I mentioned in order to support some implausible interpretations of quantum mechanics such as "consciousness causes collapse". I understand that we should abandon realism in classical sense at least because of Bell's inequalities violation, however, it seems to me that due to decoherence and other various factors we can accept realism that is not ontological, but emerges somehow.
I mean, in my opinion, the poor Schrödinger's cat is either dead or alive before the box is opened not because it actually has some define ontic state and possesses it after opening the box, but because this state emerges from wavefunction "collapsing" of many-many particles of which this cat is made because of influence of environment. And even if we can put a cat into superposition by isolating it, I don't think that this superposition can be the superposition of two macroscopic observables but of some other states (I know that my description is very rough.) That is why I am confused when authors of, for example, the last theorem extrapolate quantum pure states to macroscopic states which are likely to be mixed states. It seems to me that even if one accepts psi-ontic view, one can also accept that at some level or scale the wavefunction becomes epistemic. But maybe I am not right.
My question is: Are these theorems compatible with the notions of decoherence, coarse-grained measurements, entanglement with the environment and whatever is used to support the features of classical behavior of large systems? Or these theorems imply some kind of solipsism?