The issue with the Copenhagen interpretation is that when people claim that they support it, it doesn't actually mean that they support the stuff Bohr and Heisenberg were saying, but rather something they think is a "standard way". Their "standard way" can differ A LOT because a lot of physicists actually don't think about this stuff enough. And it's a good thing. Because many of them don't know enough about this topic (quite often it's perfectly ok for a working physicist to know QM on the level of particle in one-dimensional well, which is not enough for "interpretational" talks) Worse than that is constant misrepresentation of the Copenhagen interpretation by "interpreters" and philosophers.
If you want to understand what Copenhagen interpretation actually was the shortest way is to read Chapter 3 of the book by Werner Heisenberg "Physics and Philosophy" which is entitled... "The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory".
I would like to present the following excerpts, make from them what you want.
When we now come to the next observation. the result of which should be predicted from the theory, it is very important to realize that our object has to be in contact with the other part of the world, namely, the experimental arrangement, the measuring rod, etc., before or at least at the moment of observation. This means that the equation of motion for the probability function does now contain the influence of the interaction with the measuring device.
This influence introduces a new element of uncertainty, since the measuring device is necessarily described in the terms of classical physics; such a description contains all the uncertainties concerning the microscopic structure of the device which we know from thermodynamics, and since the device is connected with the rest of the world, it contains in fact the uncertainties of the microscopic structure of the whole world. These uncertainties may be called objective in so far as they are simply a consequence of the description in the terms of classical physics and do not depend on any observer. They may be called subjective in so far as they refer to our incomplete knowledge of the world.
We have to add some comments on the actual procedure in the quantum-theoretical interpretation of atomic events. It has been said that we always start with a division of the world into an object, which we are going to study, and the rest of the world, and that this division is to some extent arbitrary.
It should indeed not make any difference in the final result if we, e.g., add some part of the measuring device or the whole device to the object and apply the laws of quantum theory to this more complicated object. It can be shown that such an alteration of the theoretical treatment would not alter the predictions concerning a given experiment. This follows mathematically from the fact that the laws of quantum theory are for the phenomena in which Planck's constant can be considered as a very small quantity, approximately identical with the classical laws. But it would be a mistake to believe that this application of the quantum-theoretical laws to the measuring device could help to avoid the fundamental paradox of quantum theory.
The measuring device deserves this name only if it is in close contact with the rest of the world, if there is an interaction between the device and the observer. Therefore, the uncertainty with respect to the microscopic behaviour of the world will enter into the quantum-theoretical system here just as well as in the first interpretation. If the measuring device would be isolated from the rest of the world, it would be neither a measuring device nor could it be described in the terms of classical physics at all.