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I had heard that QM violates the law of bivalence.

Does anyone claim that?

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  • $\begingroup$ i was misreading something i skim read (putnam) based on an idiot friend. $\endgroup$
    – user85068
    Commented Apr 28, 2016 at 9:46
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    $\begingroup$ Not even formal logic systems are constrained to the law of bivalence. Anyway, an apparent violation of bivalence only seems to occur when you artificially impose classical notions onto quantum mechanics. $\endgroup$
    – lemon
    Commented Apr 28, 2016 at 9:51
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    $\begingroup$ Standard quantum mechanics is not a logic, it is a physical theory expressed within the realm of standard logic. All statements that you can phrase in formal quantum mechanical terms obey the standard rules of logic. this question does not make sense unless you say how you want to interpret quantum mechanics as defining a new logical system. $\endgroup$
    – ACuriousMind
    Commented Apr 28, 2016 at 12:30
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    $\begingroup$ @ACuriousMind. Saying that the OP question does not make sense is a bit harsh, since works about "quantum logic" actually do exist, for whatever their worth. $\endgroup$ Commented Apr 28, 2016 at 12:45
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    $\begingroup$ I would bet that the conclusion of many of you that the original person who made a similar statement was deeply confused about QM is just wrong. The statement was probably just a provocative, but rather rigorous formulation of the usual principle of quantum mechanics that one can't assume that observables have one of the well-defined values even in the absence of an observation. E.g. one can't assume that a particle in the double slit experiment went through one slit or the other slit, with the classical implication of this assumption on the calculation: the assumption neglects interference $\endgroup$ Commented Apr 28, 2016 at 15:13

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The words are very dangerous as the "principle of bivalence" is unavoidable in any science or system using logic – any thinking that is "rational" in this sense.

However, I would agree with the statement when carefully interpreted. The correct interpretation of the statement is that quantum mechanics forbids one to assume that either $P$ or $¬P$ is true at an intermediate moment, in the absence of an actual measurement that decides which of the options is realized, and one may always compute the probabilities of histories by summing the probabilities of the histories that include $P$ or $¬P$ at the intermediate moment.

To be specific, calculate the probability that $A_j$ at the beginning evolves to $B_k$ at the end. In the middle of the time interval, we may classically have $P$ or $¬P$. Classically, we could assume $$ P(A_j\to B_k) = P(A_j\to P \to B_k) +P (A_j\to ¬ P \to B_k)=\\ =P(A_j\to P)P(P \to B_k) +P (A_j\to ¬ P)P(¬ P \to B_k) $$ You may imagine that the experiment is the double slit experiment, $A_j$ is the particle emitted from a "cannon" while $B_k$ is the particle detected somewhere on the photographic plate. $P$ is the particle going through the left slit and its negation is the right slit.

However, quantum mechanically, this reasoning – which follows from the "framework of classical physics" and the corresponding "principle of bivalence"– is incorrect.

In particular, if $P$ and $¬P$ are two possible intermediate states of the physical system (let's assume it is a qubit, and the full Hilbert space is a tensor product of this qubit and something else), the correct law is actually similar to equation above but it uses the probability amplitudes $c$. We must first sum the complex probability amplitudes and then square the result to obtain the probability. And that's why the double slit experiment produces an interference pattern, among other things.

When we square this equation with the probability amplitudes and realize that probabilities $P=|c|^2$ by the Born rule, we will "almost" get the classical formula (my only displayed formula so far) but there will be extra mixed terms on the right hand side.

If I simplify, the classical reasoning with the "principle of bivalence" would lead us to write the total probability of the transition as $$P_P + P_{¬P} = |c_P|^2 + |c_{¬P}|^2$$ where the subscript indicates whether $P$ or $¬P$ was right in the intermediate state. But the correct actual quantum mechanical formula is actually $$|c_P + c_{¬P}|^2=\dots$$ which may also be written as $$|c_P|^2 + |c_{¬P}|^2 + 2\,{\rm Re}(c_P^* c_{¬P})$$ The last term is the mixed term i.e. the interference term. And if one is very careful about the interpretation of the statement, one could say that this mixed term exactly quantifies how much Nature deviates from the principle of bivalence.

However, to say such a thing safely, one must really understand quantum mechanics correctly – and also know why quantum mechanics basically agrees with classical physics in ordinary situations, and so on. If the statement about the "violation of the principle of bivalence" is used in the context of the people who don't really think quantum mechanically, they will unavoidably misinterpret it in a way that isn't sensible at all. And if they will believe the violation, they will abandon the good old rule of logic and keep everything else – and this will lead them to wrong conclusions and an inconsistent set of axioms. But the only correct way is to replace the whole classical reasoning about Nature by a different one, the quantum mechanical one, not just to "damage" some isolated rules.

Quantum mechanics isn't some inconsistent injured crazification of classical physics. It is (at least) an equally consistent but inequivalent framework as classical physics and its rules and axioms are as careful as those in classical physics, just different in content. A straightforward denial of the principle of bivalence in the classical reasoning wouldn't be "equally careful".

As a minimum, I would clarify the statement by saying that "quantum mechanics refutes the principle of bivalence for statements about observable quantities that were/are actually not being measured by any observer". When the measurements are made, it is always possible to assume the principle of bivalence for the possible results of such measurements.

P.S.: The equation with the sum of two probabilities that I referred to as a consequence of the "law of bivalence" may be given other names in the probability calculus. In their famous 1936 paper "The Logic of Quantum Mechanics" which has over 2,000 citations, Birkhoff and von Neumann discuss the violation of a closely related identity of mathematical logic in quantum mechanics and call it a violation of the distributive law in logic. But the source of the novelty of quantum mechanics relatively to the classical expectations about logic (expressed for probabilities) is always the same, namely the interference of the probability amplitudes.

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  • $\begingroup$ The statement that either $P$ or $\neg P$ is true is not the principle of bivalence, it is the law of the excluded middle. The principle of bivalence is a statement about the allowed truth values of propositions, the law of the excluded middle $P \vee \neg P$ is a proposition itself. $\endgroup$
    – ACuriousMind
    Commented Apr 28, 2016 at 12:23
  • $\begingroup$ I can't imagine how the statement referred to by the OP could depend on any difference between the principle of bivalence and the law of excluded middle - or even on the difference between the words "statement" and "proposition". I am surely using them as synonyms everywhere and most philosophers of language actually recommend "statement", and not "proposition", for this concept in logic, see e.g. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statement_(logic) $\endgroup$ Commented Apr 28, 2016 at 12:31
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    $\begingroup$ Furthermore, your reasoning in the middle uses the notion of probability. It is the laws of classical probability that quantum mechanics can violate, not the laws of classical logic. You are not merely using logic or the principle of bivalence to form the wrong classical expression, you are using the properties of classical probability. The properties of classical probability however follow from the axioms of the theory of classical probability and do not merely follow from classical logic. $\endgroup$
    – ACuriousMind
    Commented Apr 28, 2016 at 12:34
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    $\begingroup$ The notion of probability is completely disjoint from the laws of classical logic, and is defined by e.g. Kolmogorov's axioms. Then probability theory follows by applying logic to these axioms. To speak about the "probability" of a logical statement is impossible within pure logic. If something (like quantum mechanical probabilities) make predictions that don't behave like a classical probability, it means that it is not a classical probability, not that it doesn't obey classical logic (which is utterly nonsensical, because what logic did you use to derive those predictions?!). $\endgroup$
    – ACuriousMind
    Commented Apr 28, 2016 at 12:53
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    $\begingroup$ I can understand it. There's lots of confusion and idiosyncrasies. But there's this more specific question in the context - whether the person who originally made the statement that "QM refutes the principle of bivalence" was clueless and didn't know what he was talking about. I would bet (it's more likely) that this person knew his stuff (quantum mechanics) very well. The statement may have been just a "logician's way" of saying the usual fact that in QM, one can't assume that observables have one of the well-defined values even without an observation. $\endgroup$ Commented Apr 28, 2016 at 15:10
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There have been attempts to make sense of quantum mechanics by developing a so-called "quantum logic"; this goes back to von Neumann in the thirties.

These approaches are discussed in Quantum Logic and Its Role in Interpreting Quantum Theory (Tabia, 2010).

Two-valued logic is being questioned when one tries to formulate logical propositions involving non-commuting observables. This is clearly impossible since complementary observables do not have values defined at the same time.

An example from the above paper is a particle with a spin measured as $up$ along $z$ which could be said to have a spin either $left$ or $right$ along $x$, but at the same time could not be said to have either spin $up$ and $right$ or $up$ and $left$ (since once measured along $x$, the $z$ spin gets undefined and can be $up$ or $down$).

We end up with ($up$ and ($left$ or $right$)) being different from (($up$ and $left$) or ($up$ and $right$)))

Edit: As pointed out in the comments, once it is seen that ($up$ and $left$) is not an observable the question is not so much about how to logically articulate propositions but better about which propositions actually relate to anything real.

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  • $\begingroup$ Well, "up and left" doesn't exist at all. And similarly "up and right". It's because there's no eigenstate of both $j_x$ and $j_z$ for $j=1/2$, due to the nonzero commutator or the uncertainty principle. $\endgroup$ Commented Apr 28, 2016 at 12:24
  • $\begingroup$ Yes, as far as I am concerned I think it makes more sense to think about what exists and what doesn't than to build an alternative logic. $\endgroup$ Commented Apr 28, 2016 at 12:27
  • $\begingroup$ Exactly, but this non-existence of the truth values of "left" and "right" when we measure "up" and "down" may be viewed as a violation of the law of excluded middle, if I use a different name of a principle to please ACuriousMind. $\endgroup$ Commented Apr 28, 2016 at 12:33
  • $\begingroup$ @StéphaneRollandin so do "non-commuting observables" violate the law of bivalence? is it a fact that there are non-commuting observables in QM? $\endgroup$
    – user85068
    Commented Apr 28, 2016 at 15:03
  • $\begingroup$ In this answer I am just pointing to the field of research that considers that it is worth elaborating a specific logic for quantum systems. The example from the paper I cite (which, by the way, discusses Putnam) shows how one could get the idea that two-valued logic doesn't work in QM. But this is not my opinion. Now there are definitely non-commuting observables in QM; actually the notion of observable is QM-specific, where it replaces the notion of "property of a system". It is precisely when one confuses operators (observables) and values (properties) that common logic seems inadequate. $\endgroup$ Commented Apr 28, 2016 at 15:14

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