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I have heard a lot about the failures of even the best-funded anti-ballistic missile technology. The usual explanation is that ABM is very hard after the boost phase because of evasion techniques and the tiny margin for error. It seems reasonable that ABM would be relatively easy at the boost phase as getting the missile in the air typically requires an easily-identifiable and nearly-vertical path to be efficient.

I've read that the main obstacle to boost-phase ABM isn't intercepting the missile in boost phase but rather detecting the launch in time to attempt the interception.

It is my understanding that only a few known materials lie in the sweet spot of being stable enough to not immediately decay and unstable enough to require a low force to break the nucleus. It is also my understanding that it is possible to identify a material by its radiation profile given enough time.

So, I wonder whether it would be possible to identify specific radioactive materials at a distance - say, that of low-earth orbit - given sufficiently precise equipment and enough time to detect the profile. If it were possible, then ABM should be relatively easy - all you would need to do would be to take a survey of the radioactive material and determine whether the material is moving with a quick upward trajectory. Since material takes time to be developed (enriched) it seems like you would have enough time to spot the suspect material.

What are some problems with this kind of detection system and why, if possible, would it not be pursued?

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    $\begingroup$ If you mean can one detect the launch of the nuclear fuel in a bomb from at least tens of kilometres away (and a potential foe would likely get rather antsy about any satellite hovering above their launch sites), then absolutely not. Fission fuels are not very radioactive in the first place, fusion fuels not at all (aside from tritium): the only significant radioactivity is from any neutron initiators. Seal this in a modest bomb skin and it would be very hard to detect in the next room. $\endgroup$
    – Selene Routley
    Commented Nov 18, 2014 at 10:35
  • $\begingroup$ Related: physics.stackexchange.com/questions/6906/… $\endgroup$
    – dmckee --- ex-moderator kitten
    Commented Nov 18, 2014 at 14:50

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Not possible in practice, even though neutrinos emitted by the Plutonium might be used in principle if we ever found a way of intercepting them with almost 100% efficiency. However, there is/was a scheme to use neutrino analysis to determine whether a reactor is being used to create Plutonium

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If we ignore neutrinos, which are weakly interacting, radioactivity is still classified as alpha beta and gamma. The energies are of order MeV. Of these three, only gamma is neutral and has a chance to cross the atmosphere . Then one has to take into account the 1/r**2 diminution of the flux for the large distances . To localize a source another difficulty are the background gammas from the earth that the satellites have measured..

It is necessary to put in numbers, how much the flux of gammas from ABM's will fall off by the site of the detector, and how sensitive the detector should be to distinguish them from the background. My opinion is that it is not feasible to construct such a detection system. And the case of shielding the ABMs will be an option, if such detection is feasible.

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