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Norbert Schuch
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Yet, there are fundamental obstacles to simulating physical systems as efficiently as we want, which can be formalized using the tools of computational complexity. For instance, it is known that simulating general spin glasses areis NP-hard. Thus, unless we believe that P=NP, simulating such systems will take an exponential time (roughly). However, it should be noted that pretty much none of the relevant separations is proven: Even PSPACE, the class containing the simulation of any quantum system, is not known to differ from P (the class which is generally understood as "efficiently solvable").

So why am I claiming that a separation in computational complexity is nowhere as fundamental as the speed of light or the uncertainty relationprinciple? The latter form a "hard wall" for our attempts to increase speed or precision: There is a hard cutoff we cannot pass. The growth in computational complexity - be it time, space, or the energy needed to carry out the computation - is much more subjective. What should we use as a time cutoff? The time of ait takes to complete the PhD thesis? The lifetime of a human? The age of the universe? Which you consider "fundamental" is rather subjective. The same is true for energy scales, or space: What exactly you obtain depends on what you consider a "reasonable" investment.

As a comparison, consider that there were no speed of light, but speeding up a mass would require an energy which would grow exponentially with the speed: This would not yield a "hard" speed limit independent of the situation considered - if would really depend on how much energy you are willing to invest, and how large the mass you want to accelerate is. Of course, you could argue that all the energy available in the universe is such a hard cutoff, but this would make such a limit much more subjective, and depending on global properties of the universe, rather than. This is in stark contrast to the speed of light or the uncertainty relationsrelation, which are limitations known to hold in any scenario locally, without requiring us to take into account the whole universe altogether to make sense of them.

In principleThen, it has been shown that there are undecidable questions about physical systems one can ask. Thus, one could argue that these are fundamental limitations to simulating physical systems. But then again, there is no experiment which could answers these undecidable questions, and thus, these are rather statements about the "expressive power" of physical theories than about the ability to simulate processes in nature.

And finally, in simulating quantum mechanical systems, one is obviously limited by the limitations of quantum theory, where the observer takes a special role. Simulating the entire universe quantum mechanically is thus something which, I would argue, is outside the scope of the theory. But again, this is a limitation of the theory, not a fundamental computational limitation.

Yet, there are fundamental obstacles to simulating physical systems as efficiently as we want, which can be formalized using the tools computational complexity. For instance, it is known that general spin glasses are NP-hard. Thus, unless we believe that P=NP, simulating such systems will take an exponential time (roughly). However, it should be noted that pretty much none of the relevant separations is proven: Even PSPACE, the class containing the simulation of any quantum system, is not known to differ from P (the class which is generally understood as "efficiently solvable").

So why am I claiming that a separation in computational complexity is nowhere as fundamental as the speed of light or the uncertainty relation? The latter form a "hard wall" for our attempts to increase speed or precision: There is a hard cutoff we cannot pass. The growth in computational complexity - be it time, space, or the energy needed to carry out the computation - is much more subjective. What should we use as a time cutoff? The time of a PhD thesis? The lifetime of a human? The age of the universe? Which you consider "fundamental" is rather subjective. The same is true for energy scales, or space: What exactly you obtain depends on what you consider a "reasonable" investment.

As a comparison, consider that there were no speed of light, but speeding up a mass would require an energy which would grow exponentially with the speed: This would not yield a "hard" speed limit independent of the situation considered - if would really depend on how much energy you are willing to invest. Of course, you could argue that all the energy available in the universe is such a hard cutoff, but this would make such a limit much more subjective, and depending on global properties of the universe, rather than the speed of light or the uncertainty relations, which are limitations known to hold in any scenario locally, without requiring us to take into account the whole universe altogether.

In principle, it has been shown that are undecidable questions about physical systems one can ask. Thus, one could argue that these are fundamental limitations to simulating physical systems. But then again, there is no experiment which could answers these undecidable questions, and thus, these are rather statements about the "expressive power" of physical theories than about the ability to simulate processes in nature.

And finally, in simulating quantum mechanical systems, one is obviously limited by the limitations of quantum theory, where the observer takes a special role. Simulating the entire universe quantum mechanically is thus something which, I would argue, is outside the scope of the theory.

Yet, there are fundamental obstacles to simulating physical systems as efficiently as we want, which can be formalized using the tools of computational complexity. For instance, it is known that simulating general spin glasses is NP-hard. Thus, unless we believe that P=NP, simulating such systems will take an exponential time (roughly). However, it should be noted that pretty much none of the relevant separations is proven: Even PSPACE, the class containing the simulation of any quantum system, is not known to differ from P (the class which is generally understood as "efficiently solvable").

So why am I claiming that a separation in computational complexity is nowhere as fundamental as the speed of light or the uncertainty principle? The latter form a "hard wall" for our attempts to increase speed or precision: There is a hard cutoff we cannot pass. The growth in computational complexity - be it time, space, or the energy needed to carry out the computation - is much more subjective. What should we use as a time cutoff? The time it takes to complete the PhD thesis? The lifetime of a human? The age of the universe? Which you consider "fundamental" is rather subjective. The same is true for energy scales, or space: What exactly you obtain depends on what you consider a "reasonable" investment.

As a comparison, consider that there were no speed of light, but speeding up a mass would require an energy which would grow exponentially with the speed: This would not yield a "hard" speed limit independent of the situation considered - if would really depend on how much energy you are willing to invest, and how large the mass you want to accelerate is. Of course, you could argue that all the energy available in the universe is such a hard cutoff, but this would make such a limit much more subjective, and depending on global properties of the universe. This is in stark contrast to the speed of light or the uncertainty relation, which are limitations known to hold in any scenario locally, without requiring us to take into account the whole universe altogether to make sense of them.

Then, it has been shown that there are undecidable questions about physical systems one can ask. Thus, one could argue that these are fundamental limitations to simulating physical systems. But then again, there is no experiment which could answers these undecidable questions, and thus, these are rather statements about the "expressive power" of physical theories than about the ability to simulate processes in nature.

And finally, in simulating quantum mechanical systems, one is obviously limited by the limitations of quantum theory, where the observer takes a special role. Simulating the entire universe quantum mechanically is thus something which, I would argue, is outside the scope of the theory. But again, this is a limitation of the theory, not a fundamental computational limitation.

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Norbert Schuch
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Of course, simulating larger and larger systems is growing increasingly complex. This growth in complexity can be better or worse, depending e.g. whether the system is chaotic, or whether we want to describe classical or quantum mechanical systems.

However, there are two main points to be observed about this growth in complexity: Firstly, to some extent it relates to our current understanding of the system. For instance, quantum systems are hard to simulate, yet it turns out there are classes of systems we can solve exactly analytically. Similarly, as it turns out, the naive assumption that in order to simulate a quantum system, one has to store an exponentially large state vector is incorrect, as one can e.g. use Monte Carlo sampling to approximate the path integral pathterm by term, which allows for the simulation of systems whose state vector could never be stored in a computer. Thus, there's plenty of room for improvement, and in particular there might well be plenty of room for improvement we are not aware of as of today.

Of course, simulating larger and larger systems is growing increasingly complex. This can be better or worse, depending e.g. whether the system is chaotic, or whether we want to describe classical or quantum mechanical systems.

However, there are two main points to be observed about this growth in complexity: Firstly, to some extent it relates to our current understanding of the system. For instance, quantum systems are hard to simulate, yet it turns out there are classes of systems we can solve exactly analytically. Similarly, as it turns out, the naive assumption that in order to simulate a quantum system, one has to store an exponentially large state vector is incorrect, as one can e.g. use Monte Carlo sampling to approximate the path integral path which allows for the simulation of systems whose state vector could never be stored in a computer. Thus, there's plenty of room for improvement.

Of course, simulating larger and larger systems is growing increasingly complex. This growth in complexity can be better or worse, depending e.g. whether the system is chaotic, or whether we want to describe classical or quantum mechanical systems.

However, there are two main points to be observed about this growth in complexity: Firstly, to some extent it relates to our current understanding of the system. For instance, quantum systems are hard to simulate, yet it turns out there are classes of systems we can solve exactly analytically. Similarly, as it turns out, the naive assumption that in order to simulate a quantum system, one has to store an exponentially large state vector is incorrect, as one can e.g. use Monte Carlo sampling to approximate the path integral term by term, which allows for the simulation of systems whose state vector could never be stored in a computer. Thus, there's plenty of room for improvement, and in particular there might well be plenty of room for improvement we are not aware of as of today.

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Norbert Schuch
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There is no limitation anywhere close as fundamental as the uncertainty principle or the speed of light to simulating physical systems of any size.

Or, to be more precise, there is no limitation which we are aware of. If there were one, this would most likely constitute a most major physical discovery, comparable to relativity of quantum theory.

Of course, this is to be understood to the extent we know the underlying physical laws - quantum gravity being one prominent exception. But other than that, discovering a fundamental limitation within the assumed domain of validity of the physical theories we know would be of major scientific impact.

In particular, there is no computational limitations - which is the focus of the question - anywhere as fundamental.

Of course, simulating larger and larger systems is growing increasingly complex. This can be better or worse, depending e.g. whether the system is chaotic, or whether we want to describe classical or quantum mechanical systems.

However, there are two main points to be observed about this growth in complexity: Firstly, to some extent it relates to our current understanding of the system. For instance, quantum systems are hard to simulate, yet it turns out there are classes of systems we can solve exactly analytically. Similarly, as it turns out, the naive assumption that in order to simulate a quantum system, one has to store an exponentially large state vector is incorrect, as one can e.g. use Monte Carlo sampling to approximate the path integral path which allows for the simulation of systems whose state vector could never be stored in a computer. Thus, there's plenty of room for improvement.

Yet, there are fundamental obstacles to simulating physical systems as efficiently as we want, which can be formalized using the tools computational complexity. For instance, it is known that general spin glasses are NP-hard. Thus, unless we believe that P=NP, simulating such systems will take an exponential time (roughly). However, it should be noted that pretty much none of the relevant separations is proven: Even PSPACE, the class containing the simulation of any quantum system, is not known to differ from P (the class which is generally understood as "efficiently solvable").

However, the lack of a proven separation is not my point.

So why am I claiming that a separation in computational complexity is nowhere as fundamental as the speed of light or the uncertainty relation? The latter form a "hard wall" for our attempts to increase speed or precision: There is a hard cutoff we cannot pass. The growth in computational complexity - be it time, space, or the energy needed to carry out the computation - is much more subjective. What should we use as a time cutoff? The time of a PhD thesis? The lifetime of a human? The age of the universe? Which you consider "fundamental" is rather subjective. The same is true for energy scales, or space: What exactly you obtain depends on what you consider a "reasonable" investment.

As a comparison, consider that there were no speed of light, but speeding up a mass would require an energy which would grow exponentially with the speed: This would not yield a "hard" speed limit independent of the situation considered - if would really depend on how much energy you are willing to invest. Of course, you could argue that all the energy available in the universe is such a hard cutoff, but this would make such a limit much more subjective, and depending on global properties of the universe, rather than the speed of light or the uncertainty relations, which are limitations known to hold in any scenario locally, without requiring us to take into account the whole universe altogether.

So: For all we know, the computational limitations to simulate arbitrarily large systems lie in the scaling of computing time (and possibly storage space), which I would argue is a much weaker notion of fundamental limitation than the speed of light or the uncertainty relation.


Some comments:

I fully agree with Dvij D.C.'s comment that of course, this does not make effective theories superfluous, even if we could fully simulate everything, since the insight gained from an effective theory is often qualitatively different from the one gained from purely numerical study.

In principle, it has been shown that are undecidable questions about physical systems one can ask. Thus, one could argue that these are fundamental limitations to simulating physical systems. But then again, there is no experiment which could answers these undecidable questions, and thus, these are rather statements about the "expressive power" of physical theories than about the ability to simulate processes in nature.

And finally, in simulating quantum mechanical systems, one is obviously limited by the limitations of quantum theory, where the observer takes a special role. Simulating the entire universe quantum mechanically is thus something which, I would argue, is outside the scope of the theory.